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Abstract—While power systems are reliable infrastructures, 
their complex interconnectivities allow for propagation of 
disturbances through cascading failures which causes blackouts. 
Meanwhile the ever increasing penetration level of renewable 
generation into power grids introduces a massive amount of 
uncertainty to the grid that might have a severe impact on grid 
vulnerability to overload cascading failures. There are numerous 
studies in the literature that focus on modeling cascading failures 
with different approaches. However, there is a need for studies 
that simulate cascading failure considering the uncertainty 
coming from high penetration of renewable generation. In this 
study, the impacts of wind generation in terms of its penetration 
and uncertainty levels on grid vulnerability to cascading overload 
failures are studied. The simulation results on IEEE 300 bus 
system show that uncertainty coming from wind energy have 
severe impact on grid vulnerability to cascading overload 
failures. Results also suggest that higher penetration levels of 
wind energy if not managed appropriately will add to this severity 
due to injection of higher uncertainties into the grid.  
Index Terms—Cascading failures, renewable energy, vulnerabil-
ity analysis, uncertainty, power grids 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Electric power systems are drivers for modernity and 
sustainable growth in societies and they are considered as 
critical infrastructure requiring the highest levels of reliability. 
However, large-scale blackouts resulting from cascading 
failures impose a massive cost to societies annually. These 
cascading failures originate from strong interdependencies 
inside power grids and can even propagate into other critical 
infrastructures such as telecommunication, transportation, and 
water supply [1], [2]. Massive economic and social impacts of 
such events have motivated a great deal of research effort on 
studying the vulnerability of the power grids to cascading 
failures. A sequence of dependent failures of individual 
components that successively weakens the power system is 
defined as cascading failure [3]. This phenomenon can be 
result of different initial causes such as voltage and frequency 
instability, protection systems hidden failures, operator error, 
and transmission line overloads resulting from contingencies 
in the network. Each of these initial causes requires a different 
modelling technique and implementation of special 
approaches to evaluate grid vulnerability for certain events. 
Cascading failure due to line overloads has been under 
investigation by many researchers over past two decades. 
Probabilistic approach is among the mostly used technique to 
model the cascading behavior [4]–[9].  
On the other hand, ever increasing penetration level of 
renewable energy sources into power grids will introduce a 
large amount of uncertainty coming from their stochastic 
nature. The dynamic performance and economic settings of 
many power systems are changing due to the increased 
penetrations of renewables [10]. One worrisome change is the 
increase in cascading failures involving wind farms [11].  
With the sustained and rapid growth of renewable genera-
tion, their influence on power systems dynamic performance 
would be significant, therefore, studying cascading overload 
failures considering uncertainty coming from renewable en-
ergy and loads is of great importance. In [9] authors proposed 
a stochastic Markov model to capture the progression of cas-
cading failures considering uncertainty coming from electrical 
loads. However, the unpredictable nature of renewable gener-
ation such as wind energy will inject a large portion of uncer-
tainty into the grid having a big impact on cascading failure 
behavior. A new uncertainty modeling approach for renewable 
generation and smart grid loads proposed in [12] which enables 
us to study the impacts of increased penetration level of renew-
able generation on grid vulnerabilities.  
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of increased pen-
etration of wind generations on cascading overload failure be-
havior in power grids. The main focus is on the uncertainty 
coming from these sources and as well as electrical loads. Sim-
ulations are performed on IEEE 300 bus system for different 
scenarios. In the proposed cascading failure model, the time 
space correlation of line flows uncertainty is taken into account 
by calculating the covariance matrix of flow uncertainty. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II 
the uncertainty modeling is briefly discussed. Cascading 
failure modeling procedure and techniques used are presented 
in section III. Section IV and V will present results and 
conclusion, respectively. 
II. UNCERTAINTY MODELING 
Uncertainties coming from different sources such as 
renewable generation and loads present different characteristics 
in terms of magnitude and frequency of occurrence. In the 
model proposed in [12], the power injection from each 
  
component (i.e. output power for generators and demand power 
for loads) is modeled with two terms as shown in (1). 
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑃(𝑡) + 𝜖𝑃(𝑡)  
where 𝜇𝑃(𝑡) is the average of power signal at each time instant 
or in other words it is what we expect to have for each 
component ahead of time and 𝜖𝑃(𝑡) which is a zero mean 
signal, represents the uncertainty which may come from 
forecast error or mismatch in output power for conventional 
units.  
Using the power spectral density (PSD) of error signal, the 
occupied bandwidth for each uncertainty signal is calculated. It 
is found that wind generation injects the highest amount of 
uncertainty into the grid in terms of its bandwidth and 
magnitude and assumes all the bus voltages in the grid network 
closed to the rated voltage levels [12]. In the next section, the 
implementation of above model in cascading failure simulation 
will be explained. 
III. CASCADING FAILURE SIMULATION 
A. DC power flow and line overload modeling 
Determining the steady-state operating conditions of the 
power grid requires solving the full power flow equations that 
provide information about the voltage magnitudes and phases 
and the active and reactive power flows through each 
transmission line. Unfortunately, solving repeatedly the full 
nonlinear power flow equations becomes computationally 
prohibitive due to numerous solutions during the evolution of 
CF. In addition, we are only interested in evaluating the impact 
of wind uncertainty on grid vulnerability to CF that doesn’t 
necessarily require complete nonlinear network equations and 
the linear approximation for line active flows is sufficient for 
our tripping mechanism. For all these reasons we used DC 
power flow approximation [13] to recalculate the flow dispatch 
of the power grid at each time. Simulation of cascading failure 
is performed on IEEE 300 bus system replacing several 
conventional generators of the original system with wind 
generators according to different scenarios. The power flow 
equations for a power grid with n nodes and m links can be 
expressed as: 
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝐵′(𝑡)𝜃(𝑡)  
𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑦𝑙(𝑡))𝐴𝜃(𝑡) 
where 𝑃(𝑡) represents the vector of injected real power, 𝜃(𝑡) 
the nodal voltage angles, and 𝐹(𝑡) the flows on the lines. The 
matrix 𝐵′(𝑡) is defined as 
𝐵′(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑇𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑦𝑙(𝑡))𝐴 (4) 
where 𝑦𝑙(𝑡) = 1/𝑥𝑙 is the line admittance; 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑦𝑙(𝑡)) repre-
sents a diagonal matrix with entries of {𝑦𝑙(𝑡), 𝑙 = 1,2, … ,𝑚}. 
𝐴 ≔ (𝐴𝑙,𝑘)𝑚×𝑛 is the line-node incidence matrix, arbitrarily 
oriented and defined as: 𝐴𝑙,𝑖 = 1; 𝐴𝑙,𝑗 = −1, if the 𝑙th line is 
from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 and 𝐴𝑙,𝑘 = 0, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑗. 
Using the uncertainty modeling mentioned earlier, the 
injected power at each bus would be presented with two terms. 
Then using this representation we can form the mean and 
covariance matrices. The covariance matrix is calculated for 
each time step using the sliding window method as a 𝑚 ×𝑚 
matrix: 
𝐶𝐹(𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝐸{𝜖𝐹(𝑡)𝜖𝐹(𝑡 − 𝜏)} = [
𝐶11 ⋯ 𝐶1𝑚
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐶𝑚1 ⋯ 𝐶𝑚𝑚
]  
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝐹𝑖(𝑡), 𝜖𝐹𝑗(𝑡 − 𝜏)) 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐴, 𝐵) = 𝐸{(𝐴 − 𝜇𝐴)(𝐵 − 𝜇𝐵)} 
where 𝜖𝐹𝑙(𝑡) is the uncertainty term in flow signal of line ‘l’ at 
time t and 𝑐𝑜𝑣 is Covariance function defined in (7). In the 
simulation we utilize the unbiased estimates as  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐴, 𝐵) =
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝐴𝑖 − 𝜇𝐴)
∗(𝐵𝑖 − 𝜇𝐵)
𝑁/2
𝑖=−𝑁/2 . Note that 
sliding window method for covariance calculation selects a 
predetermined number (N) of observations of line flow errors 
and then puts them in the observation matrix. By using eq. (8), 
each element of covariance matrix is calculated based on the 
observation matrix. The variance for flow process of each line 
can then be calculated by taking square root of each diagonal 
element in covariance matrix with 𝜎𝐹𝑙(𝑡) = √𝐶𝐹𝑙,𝑙(𝑡, 0). 
With a Gaussian assumption for the distribution of 𝐹𝑙(𝑡) in  
[8, 11], the overloading probability 𝜌𝑙(𝑡) = 𝑝{|𝐹𝑙(𝑡)| > 𝐹𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥} 
can be calculated using Q-function as below: 
𝜌𝑙(𝑡) ≅ 𝑄(𝑎𝑙)  
where 𝑎𝑙 =
𝐹𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝜇𝐹𝑙(𝑡)
𝜎𝐹𝑙(𝑡)
 is the normalized overload distance of 
the lth line and Q-function as 𝑄(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑒
−𝑡2
2⁄ /(√2𝜋)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑥
.  
Finally, using the normalized overload distance (𝑎𝑙) and 
overloading probability (𝜌𝑙) for each line we can calculate the 
mean overload time for flow process 𝐹𝑙(𝑡) as follows [9]: 
𝜏?̅?
𝑢 =
2𝜋𝜌𝑙𝑒
𝑎𝑙
2/2
𝐵𝑊𝑙
  
where 𝐵𝑊𝑙  is the equivalent bandwidth of the flow process for 
the lth line and can be calculated using the spectral power 
density (SPD) of flow process [12]. 
B. Tripping mechanism and relay model 
The trip time of thermal overload relays is determined based 
on maximum allowable current flowing in the conductor 
without causing thermal instability. Generally, the overload 
relays for HV transmission lines have time-dependent tripping 
characteristic, which is determined using the well-known 
dynamic thermal balance between heat gains and losses in the 
conductor [14]. The maximum or hot spot temperature 
determines the time to trip for thermal relays and considering 
initial operation current and applying necessary changes the 
time to trip can be calculated using [15]: 
𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑝 = 𝑇𝑡ℎ . ln (
𝐹2 − 𝐹𝑜𝑝
2
𝐹2 − 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥
2)  
where 𝐹 is overload line flow (p.u.), 𝐹𝑜𝑝 is initial operating flow 
(p.u.), 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the line flow threshold, and  𝑇𝑡ℎ is thermal time 
constant which is related to conductor type and environmental 
  
parameters such as wind speed and ambient temperature [16]. 
In this study, it is assumed that all transmission lines use typical 
HAWK (477 kcmil) ACSR conductor with 𝑇𝑡ℎ = 450 sec. 
In this study, for the tripping mechanism both relay time to 
trip and overloading probability are considered simultaneously 
to select the most probable line trip during the escalation phase 
of cascading failure. At every time step, first the time to trip for 
each overloaded line is calculated, then using normalized 
overload distance (𝑎𝑙) and overloading probability (𝜌𝑙) the 
mean overload time (𝜏?̅?
𝑢) is determined. If relay time to trip is 
larger than the mean overload time, the trip timer is set to zero, 
otherwise the trip timer is set to the relay time to trip. This 
tripping mechanism enables us to model the stochastic process 
of cascading failure and identify the most probable path for its 
propagation. 
C. Island detection and power balance 
Successive line tripping during escalation phase of 
cascading failure usually leads to formation of several islands 
in power network. The electrical frequency of the system is 
driven based on the power balance according to the well-known 
electro-mechanical equation [17] 
∑𝑃𝑔𝑒𝑛 −∑𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝐻. 2𝜋
𝑑𝑓
𝑑𝑡
  
where  ∑𝑃𝑔𝑒𝑛 is the total produced power, ∑𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  is the total 
consumed power, 𝐻 is the global inertia, and 𝑓 is the electrical 
frequency of the system. The frequency in power systems is 
considered a global parameter and cannot be influenced by a 
small section. However, when a part of network becomes 
islanded, the inertia and the load balance depend only on 
generators and loads inside the island where shedding actions 
may be necessary. 
In the power balance algorithm for any island, the total load 
and total generation capacity are compared to each other. If the 
total demand exceeds the maximum available generation, 
some load shedding is necessary to maintain the power 
balance. Similarly, if total demand is smaller than the current 
generation, generation units should drop their output power. 
An automatic island detection algorithm inspired by the 
approach proposed in [17] is used after each trip to identify 
newly formed islands. Clusters of generator(s) and load(s) that 
are not connected to the grid are called island(s). The algorithm 
consists of three steps; connectivity check, critical events 
identification, and island identification. Connectivity check 
determines how many islands are present in the power system, 
and their structure. Critical event detection identifies which 
breakers should create an island if opened. And the final step, 
island detection, identifies the buses belonging to each possible 
island and calculates their load balance. The actual dispatch of 
the network is not required for the algorithm since it only 
depends on gird topology (grid incidence matrix A) and 
generators location. Assuming equal 1 Ω resistance for all lines 
in the network and using the Kirchhoff current and voltage 
laws, the equations describing system behavior are calculated. 
To detect buses belonging to each island, generators are 
activated (assuming output current of 1 A) one at a time. After 
identifying all present separate islands in the grid, their power 
balance is maintained by shedding actions. For detailed island 
detection algorithm please refer to [17]. 
IV. RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 
The simulation of cascading failure behavior considering 
wind generation uncertainty is performed on the IEEE 300 bus 
system by replacing some of its conventional generators with 
wind generators in two different scenarios. The IEEE 300 bus 
system is a synthesized network from New England power 
system and has a topology with 300 buses and 411 
transmission lines. In the first scenario 11 conventional 
generators are replaced with wind generators at buses 
80,88,125,128,156,199,222,256,258,262,295. The load and 
generation data are received from Electric Reliability Council 
of Texas (ERCOT). Uncertainty modeling of loads and 
generations are based on the model proposed in [12] and using 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) forecasting 
technique.  
The initial operating equilibrium and conditions 
(𝐺(0), 𝐿(0), 𝜃(0), 𝐹(0)) are taken or derived from the power 
flow solution. The equivalent bandwidth of flow process for 
each line under the initial uncertainty level is then calculated 
and stored to use later on stochastic tripping mechanism. The 
line capacities are set as 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜂|𝐹(0)|, 2.0(𝑝. 𝑢. )} 
with 𝜂 = 1.20. Here we take 𝐹(0) as the rational flow 
distribution under normal operating conditions and assume that 
the line capacity allows a 20% load increase [9]. The minimum 
of line capacity is set to be 2.0 p.u. so that the vibration in the 
lines which usually carry small flows will not cause frequent 
line trips. 
First scenario is designed to study the impacts of 
forecasting relative error which comes into picture in the form 
of uncertainty from wind generation. For this scenario the 
uncertainty signal magnitude for wind generator is increased 
by factor 𝛾 =
𝜖𝑤
𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜖𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑡   where 𝜖𝑤
𝑛𝑒𝑤  is the new uncertainty term 
in wind power and 𝜖𝑤
𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the initial uncertainty. 
To see the impact of larger forecasting errors on grid 
vulnerability to overload cascading failures 𝛾 is increased from 
1 to 6 with 0.25 steps to find the uncertainty level in which the 
first cascading failure occurs. All other settings of the system 
remains the same during first scenario. Table I shows the results 
for increased wind uncertainty level. 
For 𝛾 between (1-2.25) there is no tripped line thus no 
cascading failure happens for this uncertainty range. Moving 
beyond 𝛾 = 2.25 the first failure in the network is observed that 
leads to a series of cascading failures that forms multiple islands 
and isolated buses. Automatic power balance on each island 
causes the load to be dropped to a certain level that can be 
supplied by generators inside the island. Successive line trips 
continue until all line flows drop below line thresholds because 
of load shedding actions. At the end of cascading failure 
simulation for 𝛾 = 2.25, 7941 MW (32%) of total grid load is 
dropped to maintain power balance of newly formed islands. 
Also, the first and second tripped line and their respective times 
are given to identify the most vulnerable lines in the network. 
𝛾 is increased further to see the impacts of even larger 
uncertainty levels on severity of cascading failure. Fig. 1 shows 
  
the total number of tripped lines and total load shedding for 
each wind uncertainty levels. As the 𝛾 increases, the more lines 
get tripped during cascading failure which in turn leads into 
formation of more islands and larger load shedding as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
TABLE I.  CASCADING FAILURE RESULTS FOR FIRST SCENARIO: WIND 
UNCERTAINTY LEVEL 
𝜸 
Total 
trip 
count 
# of is-
lands 
formed 
Total 
LS* 
(MW) 
LS* 
(%) 
First 
tripped 
line+ 
Second 
tripped 
line+ 
2.00 0 0 0 0 - - 
2.25 0 0 0 0 - - 
2.50 68 18 7941 32 365 @ 54.7 205 @ 55 
2.75 70 19 8344 33.6 99 @ 44.8 205 @ 44.9 
3.00 71 19 8496 34.2 117 @ 44.8 207 @ 44.9 
3.25 72 20 8966 36.1 365 @ 44.6 205 @ 45 
3.50 74 21 9135 36.8 117 @ 30.4 205 @ 30.5 
3.75 75 21 9397 37.8 115 @ 29.2 205 @ 29.3 
4.00 80 22 9749 39.2 365 @ 29.2 205 @ 29.4 
4.25 83 23 10005 40.3 365 @ 28.2 205 @ 28.3 
4.50 83 23 10092 40.6 205 @ 28.2 117 @ 28.3 
4.75 83 24 10495 42.3 365 @ 15.8 205 @ 16.1 
5.00 86 25 10665 43 99 @ 15.6 205 @ 15.7 
*Load Shedding 
+Line number @ time [min] 
 
Figure 1.  Total number of line trips and toal load shedding versus 
uncertainty level (𝛾). 
The evolution process of cascading failures for different 
wind uncertainty level is shown in Fig. 2. Each evolution curve 
consists of two phases, the escalation phase for which the line 
trip rate is as high as 12 lines per minute, and the damping 
phase with line trip rate of approximately one line per minute. 
Also, it is found that as wind uncertainty level increases, the 
first trip happens earlier than smaller wind uncertainty cases 
which indicates that the minimum safety time of the entire 
network decreases. For example, the black bold line shows the 
cumulative number of line trips for uncertainty level increased 
by factor 5. As compared with uncertainty level increased by 
factor 2.5 (green line with square marker), the former results 
into higher number of tripped lines due to high level of wind 
uncertainty. Also, high uncertainty level causes contingency in 
multiple lines earlier compared to lower uncertainty levels. For 
example, the earliest cascading process is associated with the 
highest uncertainty level, 𝛾=5, as indicated in Table I and 
happens after 15 minutes of beginning of simulation, which 
implies that as more uncertainty is injected to the grid, its 
survival time gets shorter. 
The second scenario aims to see the impacts of increased 
penetration level of wind energy on grid vulnerability to cas-
cading overload failures. For this scenario, wind penetration 
ratio is 𝛼 =
∑𝑃𝐺,𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥
∑𝑃𝐺,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥  where ∑𝑃𝐺,𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the total wind genera-
tor capacity and ∑𝑃𝐺,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the total grid generation capacity. 
By replacing more conventional generators with wind genera-
tors in addition to those already installed in the network, 𝛼 is 
increased to see the impacts of higher wind penetration on grid 
vulnerability. Note that small to medium generators are se-
lected to be replaced with additional wind turbines to have 
smaller steps in 𝛼. All other settings of the system remains the 
same during second scenario. 
 
Figure 2.  The evolution process of cascading failures for different wind 
uncertainty levels. 
The results for increased wind penetration are shown in 
Table II. Starting from initial 𝛼 = 0.036, there is no line trip 
until 𝛼 = 0.09 where line 137 gets tripped at minute 2. To see 
further impacts of higher wind penetration, 𝛼 is increased to 
0.223 by replacing more mid-size conventional generators with 
wind generators. Fig. 3 shows the total number of trip line and 
load shedding for each penetration level 𝛼. It is found that the 
higher the wind penetration ratio, the more line trip and load 
shedding occurs in the network. 
TABLE II.  CASCADING FAILURE RESULTS FOR SECOND SCENARIO: WIND 
PENETRATION LEVEL. 
𝜶 
Total 
trip 
count 
# of is-
lands 
formed 
Total 
LS* 
(MW) 
LS* 
(%) 
First 
tripped 
line+ 
Second 
tripped 
line+ 
0.036 0 0 0 0 - - 
0.05 0 0 0 0 - - 
0.09 68 20 8149 33 137 @ 2 101 @ 3.8 
0.105 72 21 10156 41.1 137 @ 2 274 @ 3.8 
0.125 75 23 10701 43.3 137 @ 2 83 @ 2.7 
0.15 81 24 10890 44 137 @ 2 83 @ 2.5 
0.173 94 27 11650 47.2 137 @ 2 83 @ 2.4 
0.223 98 30 13958 56.5 137 @ 2 274 @ 2.3 
*Load Shedding 
+Line number @ time [min] 
Fig. 4 shows the evolution process of cascading failures for 
different penetration levels. As shown in Table II, the triggering 
event for all simulation is the same (line 137), while due to 
random line stochastic line trip based on different uncertainty 
  
level, each one of them evolves into a different path. This 
potentially identifies the weakest backbone line of the network 
according to the new configuration of wind generators. For 
example, black bold line shows the cumulative number of line 
trips for 9% wind penetration level where starts after nearly 
minute 5 of simulation and stabilizes at minute 28. While, 
increasing wind penetration to 22.3% (green line with square 
marker) results into higher tripping rate, as large as 20 lines per 
minute during escalation phase of cascading failure, and more 
total number of tripped lines.  
 
Figure 3.  Total number of line trips and toal load shedding versus wind 
penetartion level (𝛼). 
 
Figure 4.  The evolution process of cascading failures for different wind 
penetartion levels. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Gird vulnerability to cascading overload failures is 
evaluated under high penetration of wind energy. Line flow 
uncertainty is modeled as a zero mean signal with Gaussian 
distribution. Thermal stability and automatic power balance are 
considered in the simulation of cascading failures in IEEE 300 
bus system. The DC power flow approximation is used as a 
simple way to calculate flow distribution of the system at each 
time step and find overloaded lines. Simulation results show 
that both high uncertainty level and high penetration level of 
wind generation have adverse impact on grid vulnerability to 
cascading failure. It is found that, higher uncertainty injected 
from wind due to poor forecasting results leads to severe 
situations in terms of total number of trip lines and load 
shedding. It is also found that, increasing wind penetration to a 
certain level, if not managed appropriately, may result into 
cascading failure due to considerable level of uncertainty 
injected and the higher the penetration the more lines get 
tripped and larger load shedding will be performed. Therefore, 
appropriate management of uncertainties via energy storage or 
advanced forecasting techniques is necessary for sustained 
growth in renewable generation. As the future extension of this 
study, it is of interest to incorporate AC power flow and more 
accurate system model to investigate voltage profiles during 
cascading failure evolution. 
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